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Introduction		Conversion	is	a	term	often	used	for	exchanging	one	currency	into	another.	This	can	be	done	on	basis	of	daily	exchange	rates:	the	spot	rates,	but	also	on	basis	of	future	needs:	 the	 forward	rates.	There	 is	a	second	type	of	conversion,	which	 in	economic	terms	may	be	much	more	relevant	than	the	currency	spot	and	forward	rates:	it	is	the	capacity	of	governments,	central	banks	and	the	financial	sector	to	turn	long	term	debt	obligations	into	daily	tradable	ones	and	vice	versa.		Currently,	individual	households,	governments,	central	banks,	pension	funds	and	the	banking	system	converts	current	income	into	future	expenditure	and	convert	current	expenditure	into	future	debt	obligations.		Individual	 households	 do	 this	 by	 saving	 for	 a	 future	 pension	 and/or	 making	other	savings	to	spend	at	a	future	date.	They,	collectively,	also	use	other	people’s	savings	 to	 spend	 in	 the	 current	 period	 by	 entering	 into	 long-term	 mortgage	obligations	or	taking	out	student	loans.		Governments	are	major	players	in	the	conversion	processes.	They	borrow	funds	to	accommodate	current	expenditure,	but	also	borrow	for	infrastructure	projects	that	 require	 very	 long	 term	 pay	 back	 periods	 with	 very	 uncertain	 cash	 flows.	They,	 sometimes,	 do	 not	 record	 future	 payment	 obligations	 originating	 from	pension	promises	to	civil	servants	and	other	households.		Central	banks	also	actively	participate	in	the	conversion	process.	In	response	to	the	 2007-2008	 financial	 crisis,	 the	 five	 central	 banks	 of	 the	 U.S.,	 U.K.,	 the	Eurozone,	Japan	and	Switzerland	collectively	injected	some	$11	trillion	into	their	economies	 through	 quantitative	 easing.	 Only	 this	 year	 has	 the	 Fed	 began	 to	reduce	its	balance	sheet,	while	the	U.K.	has	postponed	its	reduction	process.	The	ECB	has	stopped	buying	government	bonds	recently.		Pension	 funds	 are	 major	 players	 in	 the	 conversion	 process.	 According	 to	 the	latest	 statistics,	 they	 manage	 $41.4	 trillion	 in	 accumulated	 assets1.	 Monthly	payouts	have	to	be	squared	with	expected	future	income	flows.		Banks	make	their	living	from	the	conversion	process.	Deposit	taking,	often	short-term,	is	converted	into	longer	term	lending	both	to	governments,	businesses	and	individual	households.	Securitization	has	the	opposite	effect.		The	 main	 cause	 of	 the	 2007-2008	 financial	 crisis	 was	 that	 long	 term	 debt	obligations	 on	 U.S.	 home	mortgages	were	 converted	 into	 daily	 tradable	 assets	creating	losses	arising	from	mispricing	the	risks	associated	with	such	assets.	The	conversion	 process	 betrayed	 a	 key	 weakness	 in	 managing	 economic	developments.																																																																																																																	1	Willis,	Towers	Watson	Global	Pension	Assets	study	2017	
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1.	What	happens	in	the	conversion	process?	
	The	aim	for	all	investors	is	to	make	a	profit	on	their	investments.	Profits	are	to	be	maximized	and	losses	minimized.	This	profit	aim	does	not	square	well	with	the	conversion	processes	applied	by	governments,	central	banks,	banks	and	pension	funds.		Individual	 households	 are	nearly	 always	 restricted	 in	 their	 conversion	process	by	the	limits	of	their	income	levels.	They	are	limited	in	their	mortgage	borrowing	capacity	 by	what	 the	 banks	 deem	 responsible	 borrowing	 levels.	 They	 are	 also	restricted	 through	 their	 income	 level	 in	 the	 amounts	 that	 can	 be	 set	 aside	 for	future	 pension	 benefits.	 Furthermore,	 job	 opportunities;	 inflation	 and	 taxation	levels	 may	 pose	 further	 restrictions	 on	 using	 future	 incomes	 for	 current	expenditure	outlays.		In	 the	 run	 up	 to	 the	 financial	 crisis	 of	 2007-2008,	 two	 distinct	 stages	 in	 the	conversion	process	occurred	in	the	U.S.	Firstly,	from	2004-2007	the	percentage	of	mortgages	granted	as	so-called	subprime	mortgages	increased	to	some	14%	of	all	mortgages	granted	by	the	end	of	2007.	Subprime	indicates	that	the	subprime	borrowers	 were	 less	 creditworthy	 than	 regular	 mortgage	 borrowers.	 Many	 of	the	subprime	borrowers	banked	on	a	continued	increase	in	house	prices	in	order	to	 protect	 them	 in	 the	 event	 that	 their	 income	 levels	 could	 no	 longer	 support	their	interest	and	repayment	obligations.	Secondly,	from	2004	and	in	later	years,	U.S.	 banks	 and	 especially	 the	 investment	 banking	 side	 of	 the	 banking	 sector	seized	 on	 an	 opportunity	 to	 transfer	 the	 funding	 and	most	 of	 the	 credit	 risks	arising	 from	home	mortgages	 to	 third	parties	 through	 securitization	and	using	the	credit	derivative	markets.	The	main	motivation	of	 these	 institutions	was	 to	bring	forward	the	profit	stream	locked	up	in	long-	term	mortgages.	The	buyers	of	these	products,	which	often	received	at	least	an	AA	rating	from	U.S.	credit	rating	agencies,	were	some	individuals,	but	on	the	whole	mostly	institutional	investors.	Many	of	such	mutual	funds	were	listed	on	stock	markets,	so	that	participants	in	these	funds	had	the	opportunity	to	sell	at	any	time	they	wished.		Long	 term	 funding	 had	 been	 converted	 into	 daily	 tradeable	 obligations.	 The	conversion	process	was	complete.		What	 needs	 to	 be	 understood	 is	 that	 lending	 banks	 underwrote	mortgages	 to	make	 a	 profit	 from	 them.	 They	 expected	 that	 doubtful	 debtors	 levels	 would	remain	 below	 their	 provisions	 level	made	 for	 such	 event	 occurring	 during	 the	lifetime	of	the	mortgages.	So	far	this	was	a	logical	extension	of	a	supply,	demand	and	 risk	 factor	 assessment	 by	 the	 lenders.	What	 was	 not	 logical	 was	 that	 the	profit	motive	led	banks	to	sell	credit	risks	to	investors	without	a	bank	guarantee	for	performance.	If	a	company	sold	a	faulty	product,	product	liability	rules	would	be	 enforced	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 customer	would	not	 suffer	 any	 financial	 losses.	Why	did	the	same	rules	not	apply	to	the	investment	banking	community?																																																																																																												
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2.	The	effects	of	transferring	mortgage	risks	in	the	U.S.	
	Individual	mortgage	borrowers	are,	by	their	very	nature,	borrowers	who	depend	on	 banks	 and	 other	 financial	 institutions	 to	 grant	 them	 a	 mortgage	 loan.	 The	decision-making	is	wholly	on	the	financial	sector	side.		Mistakes	 made	 by	 the	 financial	 sector	 should	 have	 led	 to	 institutions,	 their	shareholders	and	 their	management	 teams	accepting	 responsibility	and	paying	for	their	actions.	An	individual	bank	may	claim	that	it	was	the	collective	behavior	of	all	banks	and	financial	institutions	in	granting	mortgage	loans	and	that	the	last	lender	tipped	over	the	whole	structure	of	mortgage	lending.	However,	both	the	banking	and	 financial	 regulators	as	well	 as	each	 individual	 financial	 institution	involved	 in	mortgage	 lending,	 should	have	been	alert	 to	 the	risks	 taken	during	the	2004	to	2007	mortgage	lending	period.		The	selling	off	of	such	mortgage	portfolios	accelerated	during	the	period	2004-2007	as	compared	to	previous	periods.		Securitization	began	to	take	off	in	the	mid-1990s.	The	total	amount	of	mortgage-backed	securities	issued	almost	tripled	between	1996	and	2007,	to	$7.3	trillion.	The	 securitized	 share	 of	 subprime	mortgages	 (i.e.,	 those	 passed	 to	 third-party	investors	via	mortgage	backed	securities)	increased	from	54%	in	2001,	to	75%	in	2006.	The	subprime	part	of	all	home	mortgages	reached	$1.46	trillion	at	the	beginning	of	2007	or	about	14%	of	the	total	home	mortgage	amount	outstanding	in	 the	 U.S.	 at	 the	 time.	 	In	 the	mid-2000s	 as	 the	 housing	market	was	 peaking,	Government	Sponsored	Enterprises	 (GSE)	securitization	market	 share	declined	dramatically,	 while	 higher-risk	 subprime	 and	 Alt-A2 	mortgage	 private	 label	securitization	 grew	 sharply.	As	mortgage	 defaults	 began	 to	 rise,	 it	 was	 among	mortgages	securitized	by	the	private	banks.	GSE	mortgages	–securitized	or	not–	continued	to	perform	better	than	the	rest	of	the	market.			
2.1	The	conversion	effects	on	individual	mortgage	borrowers		The	selling	of	such	mortgage	portfolios	in	secondary	markets	did	nothing	for	the	original	 borrowers.	 They	 did	 not	 gain	 anything	 from	 it.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 their	obligations	were	to	be	fulfilled	over	a	30	year	period	and	a	daily	price	setting	for	such	 risks,	 -as	was	 the	 standard	 in	mutual	 funds	 invested	 in	mortgage	 backed	securities-,	 left	 the	door	wide	open	 for	defaults	on	some	of	 the	portfolios.	This	had	a	contagion	effect	on	all	mortgage	loans	included	in	such	portfolio.	Good	and	bad	 mortgage	 loans	 became	 callable	 on	 a	 daily	 basis.	 Bad	 lending	 decisions	infected	sound	lending!			
																																																																																												2	Alt-A	mortgages	are	better	loans	than	sub-prime,	but	below	prime	mortgages		
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2.2	The	Northern	Rock	example	
	Northern	Rock	was	a	U.K.	building	society,	with	a	history	dating	back	to	1850.	In	1997,	it	decided	to	demutualize	and	turn	into	a	bank.	Its	main	product	line	was	home	mortgages.	It	was	an	aggressive	lender	and	by	mid-2007,	it	had	captured	a	market	 share	 of	 19%	 of	 all	 new	mortgages	 sold	 in	 the	 U.K.	 at	 the	 time.3	This	made	it	the	market	leader	in	the	U.K.	Its	total	asset	base	at	the	time	was	£113bn.		Northern	 Rock	 was	 quite	 unique	 among	 U.K.	 banks	 in	 relying	 on	 short-term	wholesale	 money	 market	 funds	 for	 over	 70%	 of	 its	 funding.	 Most	 other	 U.K.	banks	 relied	 heavily	 on	 ‘sticky’	 customer	 deposits	 to	 fund	 their	 long-term	lending.		Northern	 Rock’s	 wholesale	 funding	 structure	 was	 executed	 through	 offshore	vehicles.	On	the	9th	of	August	2007,	BNP	Paribas	decided	to	suspend	three	of	its	investment	funds	with	exposure	to	the	troubled	U.S.	mortgage	market,	including	sub-prime	 mortgages.	 The	 worldwide	 banking	 sector	 curbed	 lending	 to	 each	other	as	a	consequence	of	the	uncertainties	about	potential	losses	and	contagion	risks.	Overnight	 interbank	 interest	rates	shot	up.	Northern	Rock	was	one	of	 its	earliest	“victims”,	as	a	lack	of	willingness	by	other	money	providers	to	roll	over	existing	 exposure	 and	 increasing	 costs	 of	 funds	 conspired	 to	 inflict	 material	damage	to	the	banks’	financial	condition	and	prospects.		On	14	September	2007,	a	joint	statement	by	the	Bank	of	England,	Treasury	and	the	 Financial	 Services	 Authority	 was	 issued,	 which	 said	 that	 they	 all	 believed	Northern	Rock	to	be	solvent	and	that	the	standby	funding	facility	would	enable	the	bank	“to	 fund	 its	operations	during	 the	current	period	of	 turbulence	 in	 the	financial	markets”.		This	statement	did	little	to	take	away	the	fear	factor.	On	17	September	2007,	the	result	was	a	run	on	Northern	Rock	by	individual	customers	as	customer	deposits	were	only	 secured	 to	 the	extent	of	 £33,000.	This	was	 the	 first	 run	on	any	U.K.	banking	institution	since	1878.		Through	 a	 process	 of	 conversion,	 Northern	 Rock’s	 long-term	 lending	 had	morphed	 into	 short	 term	 funding	 obligations.	 After	 the	 BNP	 Paribas	 fund	closures,	 Northern	 Rock’s	 funding	 flows	 from	 wholesale	 markets	 virtually	evaporated	and	their	costs	of	funding	increased	rapidly.	Northern	Rock’s	equity	capital	buffer	and	its	level	of	liquid	funds	were	woefully	inadequate	to	cope	with	these	shocks.	Confidence	was	shattered.		The	run	on	Northern	Rock	drove	the	Bank	of	England	to	grant	the	bank	a	three-year	 loan	 of	 £25	 billion,	 but	 reactively	 after	 the	 run	 on	 Northern	 Rock	 had	occurred.	To	calm	the	fears	of	depositors	in	Northern	Rock,	the	Chancellor	of	the																																																												3	http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/7007076.stm	
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																																																								Conversion	Theory:	The	key	to	understanding	the	2008	financial	crisis	©Drs	Kees	De	Koning			Exchequer	issued	a	100%	guarantee	to	all	private	depositors	at	Northern	Rock,	for	£35,000	instead	of	the	prevailing	limit	of	£33,000.		The	Northern	Rock	example	was	used	as	it	had	only	U.K.	mortgages	on	its	books.	It	did	not	have	any	overseas	mortgage	exposure.	It	had	not	underwritten	any	U.S.	mortgages	of	any	type.	Nevertheless	its	funding	structure,	pricing	of	its	funding	and	use	of	conversion	led	to	its	dramatic	demise.		
2.3	Lessons	to	be	learned	from	the	Northern	Rock	debacle	
	The	 first	 lesson	 is	 that	 solvency	 for	 a	 bank	 is	 subordinated	 to	 its	 liquidity	position,	either	a	realistic	one	or	a	perceived	one	by	a	bank’s	customers.	Trust	by	customers	 can	 easily	 and	 quickly	 be	 lost	 in	 case	 any	 doubts	 arise	 about	 a	financial	institution’s	ability	to	repay	customer	deposits.	No	one	wants	to	be	the	last	 customer	 in	 line	waiting	 to	 see	whether	 a	 bank	 can	 return	 its	 deposit.	 All	customers	 want	 priority	 treatment,	 rather	 than	 waiting	 for	 a	 government	sponsored	rescue	scheme	to	be	put	in	place.		The	second	lesson	is	that	over-reliance	on	the	mortgage-backed	security	markets	for	a	substantial	share	of	its	funding	exposes	a	bank	to	acutely	increased	liquidity	risks,	either	in	the	volume	of	borrowings	and/or	in	its	cost	of	funds.		The	 third	 lesson	 is	 that	 developments	 are	 inter-linked.	 If,	 in	 2007,	 the	 U.S.	mortgage	 backed	 securities	 had	 been	 regarded	 as	 a	 sound	 investment,	 then	 it	would	 have	 been	 unlikely	 that	 BNP	 Paribas	would	 have	 stopped	 trading	 in	 its	three	 investment	 funds.	The	suspicion	that	something	was	amiss	and	that	such	situation	 would	 lead	 to	 investment	 losses	 for	 the	 fund	 providers	 would	 have	been	 reduced.	 The	 conversion	 of	 long	 term	 into	 daily	 tradeable	 obligations	would	have	remained	an	acceptable	proposition.	Northern	Rock	would	have	had	less	 difficulty	 in	 funding	 its	 mortgage	 portfolio.	 However,	 the	 key	 was	 that	Northern	Rock,	just	like	many	American	investment	banks,	relied	too	strongly	on	interbank	 and	 financial	 market	 funding.	 The	 financial	 regulators	 did	 not	challenge	Northern	Rock’s	risk	structure.	Nor	did	the	financial	regulators	in	the	U.S.	 act	 upon	 the	 risks	 associated	 with	 sub-prime	 mortgages,	 especially	 their	conversion	 into	 mortgage-backed	 securities.	 In	 order	 to	 generate	 profits	 for	themselves	 in	 the	 short	 run,	 most	 U.S.	 investment	 banks	 sold	 so-called	“investment	 grade”	 paper	 that	 ended	 up	 in	 losses	 for	 the	 investors,	 including	American	Insurance	Group	(AIG).		The	main	reason	that	so	few	economists	predicted	the	financial	crisis	of	2008	is	that	 the	economic	models	 that	were	used	by	Central	Banks	and	others	did	not	include	the	losses	on	daily	tradable	securities	as	an	indicator	of	future	economic	growth	constraints.	However	these	losses	caused	interbank	lending	to	come	to	a	grinding	halt	in	2007,	as	banks	no	longer	trusted	one	another	any	more.					
	 8	
																																				Conversion	Theory:	The	key	to	understanding	the	2008	financial	crisis	©Drs	Kees	De	Koning	
	
	
3.	The	effects	of	misdiagnosing	financial	developments	in	the	U.S.	
	In	the	U.S.,	a	liability	regime	for	mis-selling	financial	products	did	and	does	exist.	As	at	October	2017,	$150	billion	in	fines	had	been	collected	by	the	Department	of	Justice	 from	various	U.S.	and	 foreign	banks	 involved	 in	 the	subprime	mortgage	crisis.4	However	 the	 strange	 element	 in	 all	 this	 is	 that	 the	 proceeds	 were	 not	used	 to	 compensate	 home	 mortgage	 borrowers,	 but	 were	 used	 for	 general	government	expenditure	purposes.		The	detrimental	 impact	on	home	mortgage	borrowers,	 on	 the	 income	 levels	of	many	 individual	 households	 and	 on	 government	 revenues	 and	 expenditure	levels	 can	 be	 illustrated	 with	 a	 few	 statistics	 about	 employment	 levels,	government	debt	levels,	new	housing	starts	and	average	income	levels.		In	May	2007,	 the	U.S.	 economy	had	an	unemployment	 rate	of	4.4%	with	2.231	million	unemployed	persons.	By	October	2009	the	unemployment	rate	had	gone	up	 to	10.0%	with	9.087	million	unemployed5.	Nearly	7	million	 individuals	 lost	their	 jobs	 in	 slightly	 over	 two-years.	 It	 took	 to	 July	2018	 to	 get	 the	number	of	unemployed	back	down	to	2.406	million.	This	was	an	adjustment	period	of	over	11	years	marked	by	tremendous	hardship	for	those	unemployed	during	it.		One	of	the	other	main	consequences	of	the	financial	crisis	was	the	change	in	U.S.	government	debt	 levels6.	 In	2007	Q4,	the	outstanding	level	of	government	debt	was	 $9.229	 trillion.	 By	 2017	 Q4	 the	 level	 had	 more	 than	 doubled	 to	 $20.492	trillion.	 To	 put	 this	 in	 a	 historical	 perspective:	 from	Q4	 1977	 to	 Q4	 1987	 U.S.	Federal	 government	 debt	 increased	 by	 338%	 from	 $	 718.9	 billion	 to	 $2.431	trillion.	From	Q4	1987	to	Q4	1997	the	debt	increased	by	226%	to	$5.502	trillion.	From	Q4	1997	 to	Q4	2007	 the	debt	 increased	by	168%	 to	$	9.229	 trillion	and	from	Q4	2007	to	Q4	2017	the	debt	increased	by	222%	to	$	20.492	trillion.		In	a	study7	by	William	Dupor,	economist	at	the	Federal	Reserve	Bank	in	St.	Louis,	it	was	calculated	 that,	as	a	consequence	of	 the	recession,	 the	debt	 to	GDP	 level	increased	by	16%	from	Q2	2007	to	Q2	2009	or	8%	per	year.	From	Q2	2009	to	Q2	2012	the	ratio	increased	by	6.2%	per	year.	From	Q2	2012	to	Q2	2015	the	ratio	only	increased	by	1.4%	per	year.																																																																																																	4	https://www.dwhttp.com/en/financial-crisis-bank-fines-hit-record-10-years-after-market-collapse/a-40044540Benjam		5	https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/UNRATE/		6	https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GFDEBTN	7	https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-the-economy/2017/january/how-us-debt-gdp-ratio-changed	
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																																																								Conversion	Theory:	The	key	to	understanding	the	2008	financial	crisis	©Drs	Kees	De	Koning			From	Q3	 in	2007	to	Q3	 in	2009	the	U.S.	government	debt	 level	 increased	 from	$9.007	trillion	to	$13.561	trillion,	an	increase	of	$	4.554	trillion.	Nominal	GDP	for	the	 U.S	 was	 $14.535	 trillion	 by	 Q3	 2007	 on	 an	 annualized	 basis	 and	 $14.420	trillion	 on	 the	 same	 basis	 per	 Q3	 2009.	 This	 implies	 that	 the	 U.S.	 government	received	 fewer	 taxes	 and	 had	 to	 increase	 social	 security	 payments	 for	 a	 total	amount	of	some	$4.5	trillion	over	a	two-year	period.		U.S.	individual	households,	as	the	ultimate	guarantor	of	U.S.	government	debt,	suffered	a	heavy	loss.		The	recession	had	a	dramatic	effect	on	the	 level	of	new	housing	starts8.	A	peak	was	reached	in	January	2006	when	2.273	million	new	homes	were	started	on	an	annualized	basis.	By	April	2009,	this	level	had	dropped	to	478,	000	and	by	June	2018,	new	housing	starts	were	only	still	at	about	half	the	level	of	2006	at	1.177	million	new	homes	on	a	per	annum	basis.		The	 total	 U.S.	 outstanding	 home	 mortgage	 amounts	 for	 Q1	 2008	 were	 $10.6	trillion.9	By	Q1	2018	these	volumes	only	stood	at	$10.1	trillion.		Over	a	ten-year	period,	the	volume	of	outstanding	mortgage	loans	had	barely	kept	pace	with	the	repayments	level.	No	wonder	that	home	ownership	levels	have	dropped10.	A	low	point	for	home	ownership	was	Q1	1994,	when	home	ownership	reached	a	long-term	low	of	63.8%	in	the	U.S.	By	Q2	2004	it	reached	its	peak	of	69.2%.	Since	then	it	continued	to	drop	to	a	new	low	of	62.9%	by	Q2	2016.	The	latest	data	are	for	Q1	2018	when	the	level	reached	64.2%.	The	changes	in	home	ownership	and	in	the	level	of	mortgages	outstanding	plus	the	new	housing	starts	statistics	all	show	the	harmful	long-term	effects	of	the	mortgage-backed	securities	misselling	disaster.		U.S.	 real	 median	 income	 level	 is	 another	 statistic	 that	 sheds	 lights	 on	 the	economic	 picture	 over	 the	 last	 20	 years.	 The	 U.S	 real	 median	 income	 level11	reached	 $60,062	 in	 1999,	 a	 high	 compared	 to	 previous	 years;	 by	 2007	 it	 had	fallen	slightly	 to	$59,534.	The	 financial	 crash	had	a	profound	effect	on	 the	real	median	household	 income	level	as	 it	dropped	to	$	54,569	by	2012	and	only	by	2016	had	it	reached	the	level	of	1999	again	at	the	level	of	$60,309.	In	real	terms,	median	incomes	barely	moved	over	a	20-year	period.	The	major	drop	occurred	between	2007	 and	2012.	 It	 took	 another	 four	 years	 to	 reach	 the	 same	 income	level	as	about	20	years	earlier.				
	
	
																																						
																																																									8https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/HOUST	9	https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/HHMSDODNSFederal	10	https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/RHORUSQ156N	11	https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MEHOINUSA672N/	
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4	Some	choices	revisited	
	In	 this	 chapter	 some	 questions	 will	 be	 raised	 about	 the	 approaches	 used	 to	counteract	the	effects	of	the	subprime	mortgage	lending.		
4.1	The	legal	approach	
	In	a	previous	paper	by	this	writer:	“Did	Central	Banks	apply	the	right	strategies	after	 the	 financial	 crisis?12”,	 the	 level	 of	 Foreclosure	 Filings,	 the	 Completed	Foreclosures	 and	 the	 Home	 Repossessions	 over	 the	 period	 2004-2016	 were	explored.	Over	the	years	2007	to	2014	inclusive	21.228	million	U.S.	households	were	confronted	with	Foreclosure	Filings.	In	the	U.S.	household	survey	of	200713	it	 was	 calculated	 that	 in	 2007,	 there	 were	 51.234	 million	 households	 with	 a	mortgage.	 The	 fact	 that	 21.228	 million	 (or	 41.4%	 of	 all	 mortgage	 holders	households)	 were	 confronted	 with	 Foreclosure	 Filings	 over	 the	 period	 2007-2014	 showed	 the	 significant	 legal	 powers	 at	 the	 disposal	 of	 the	 lenders.	 The	subprime	 share	 of	 the	 total	 mortgage	 market	 was	 around	 14%	 of	 the	 total	market	size	 in	200714	or	about	$1.5	 trillion	 in	volume.	The	securitized	element	was	about	75%	of	the	$1.5	trillion	or	$	1.1	trillion.			The	 question	 has	 to	 be	 raised	 how	was	 it	 possible	 that	 41.4%	of	 all	mortgage	holders	were	affected	and	threatened	with	foreclosures	and	home	repossessions	over	 the	 period	 2007-2014,	 while	 the	 securitized	 subprime	 market	 size	 was	“only”	10.4%	of	all	outstanding	home	mortgages	in	2007.		One	 can	 only	 compare	 it	 to	 a	 snowball	 effect.	 It	 starts	 relatively	 small,	 but	increases	with	more	and	more	homeowners	being	threatened	with	foreclosures	and	home	repossessions.	Over	 the	period	2007	 to	2011,	 the	median	U.S.	home	sales	price15	dropped	from	$313.600	in	2007	to	$263,400	in	2011.	Only	by	2014	did	average	house	prices	return	to	the	2007	level.	More	foreclosure	filings	led	to	a	greater	drop	in	average	home	sales	prices.		There	is	and	must	be	a	better	way	to	run	an	ailing	economy	and	one	that	is	not	based	on	foreclosures.		
	
																																																									12	https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/82751	13	https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_17_1YR_S2506&prodType=table	14	https://www.frbsf.org/education/publications/doctor-econ/2009/december/subprime-mortgage-statistics/	15	https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MSPUS	
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4.2	The	economic	approach	
	The	economic	downturn	in	2007-2009	prompted	the	U.S.	Federal	government	to	borrow	 an	 additional	 amount	 of	 more	 than	 $4.5	 trillion	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	lower	 tax	 receipts	 and	 higher	 social	 security	 payments.	 This	 spending	 did	prevent	 economic	 growth	 from	 dropping	 further	 than	 without	 it	 but	nevertheless	Real	GDP	levels16	dropped	from	Q3	2007	on	an	annualized	level	of	$15.667	trillion	to	Q3	2009	$15.189	trillion	measured	on	the	same	annual	basis.	In	other	words	the	$4.5	trillion	injection	was	unable	to	stem	the	slightly	over	3%	loss	in	real	GDP	over	this	period.		The	 Federal	 Reserve	 engaged	 in	 large-scale	 asset	 purchases	 over	 a	 number	 of	years:	 Quantitative	 Easing.	 In	 an	 article	 written	 by	 Stephen	 D.	 Williamson17:		“How	well	does	this	tool	work?”	the	author	explains	the	use	and	the	prescribed	benefits	 from	 this	 unconventional	 policy	 tool.	 The	 main	 aim	 was	 a	 liquidity	supply	to	the	financial	markets	and	a	tool	to	adjust	especially	long-term	interest	rates.	 The	 assets	 purchased	 were	 government	 treasuries	 and	 some	 corporate	bonds	 and	 mortgage	 backed	 securities,	 the	 latter	 mostly	 from	 Government	Sponsored	Enterprises,	such	as	Fannie	Mae	and	Freddy	Mac.	In	total	$3.6	trillion	of	 assets	were	purchased	 in	 three	different	programs.18	Currently	 the	Fed	 is	 in	the	process	of	selling	some	of	its	holdings.		
4.3	An	Alternative	Economic	Approach	
	With	 over	 $8	 trillion	 spend	 between	 the	 U.S.	 Government	 and	 the	 Federal	Reserve,	the	first	through	borrowings	(debt	creation	in	2008	and	2009)	and	the	latter	 through	 money	 creation;	 one	 may	 wonder	 why	 the	 economic	 recovery	took	 so	 long	 to	 materialize.	 After	 all,	 the	 amount	 of	 securitized	 sub-prime	mortgages	outstanding	was	“only”	$	1.1	trillion	at	its	highest	level.		It	seems	that	the	key	to	understanding	what	happened	is	linked	to	the	changes	in	the	 financial	position	of	 individual	households.	They	were	 the	ones	affected	by	foreclosure	filings,	 increased	unemployment	rates,	dropping	house	prices	while	their	 outstanding	 debt	 levels	 remained	 static.	 Arrears	 in	 payment	 obligations	forced	many	to	forego	additional	consumption.	Many	of	them	were	also	the	ones	who	 lost	 their	 own	 equity	 in	 their	 homes:	 a	 loss	 that	 caused	 dropping	 home	ownership	levels	as	they	could	no	longer	save	enough	for	down	payments	on	a	different	home.	Indirectly,	each	household	would	have	to	pay	for	the	$4.5	trillion	in	 the	 additional	 government	 debt.	 The	 simple	 conclusion	 was	 and	 is	 that	individual	households	were	 left	 to	manage	on	their	own	while	being	presented	with	the	bill	from	the	greed	and	mismanagement	by	the	financial	sector.																																																									16	https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDPC1/	17	https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/regional-economist/third-quarter-2017/quantitative-easing-how-well-does-this-tool-work	18	http://www.numbernomics.com/nomicsnotes/?p=7375	
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																																																								Conversion	Theory:	The	key	to	understanding	the	2008	financial	crisis	©Drs	Kees	De	Koning		The	concept	by	the	financial	sector	was	one	of	instant	profits	for	us	–the	sellers	of	risks-	and	the	potential	losses	for	others:	including	the	general	public	and	the	government.	 This	 is	 why	 banking	 and	 other	 financial	 sector	 profits	 cannot	 be	compared	 with	 profits	 from	 ordinary	 companies.	 The	 latter	 do	 not	 trade	 in	financial	risks.		The	main	objective	of	an	alternative	economic	approach	is	to	stop	the	snowball	effect	in	its	tracks.	Only	by	doing	so	can	the	economy	keep	functioning	to	its	full	potential,	 rather	 than	 accept	 the	 snowball	 effect	 of	 cumulative	 losses	 to	individual	households,	to	companies	and	the	government.		In	2007-2008,	 the	cause	of	 the	crisis	was	the	 losses	 incurred	or	expected	to	be	incurred	 by	 investors	 in	 U.S.	 mortgage	 backed	 securities.	 A	 U.S	 government	backed	 fund	 could	 have	 been	 put	 in	 place	 to	 buy	 up	 such	 mortgage-backed	securities,	especially	the	ones	that	had	a	substantial	share	of	sub-prime	and	Alt-A	mortgages.	The	Federal	Reserve,	with	the	proviso	that	the	Federal	Government	would	cover	any	losses,	could	have	affected	such	purchases.	The	Federal	Reserve	could	track	down	the	originators	of	the	mortgages	and	force	them	to	hand	over	the	 accumulated	 loan	 loss	 reserves	 to	 the	Federal	Reserve	 as	well	 as	 at	 future	dates	any	future	provision	that	should	be	made	over	the	remaining	years	of	the	mortgage.	 The	 originators	 should	 be	 held	 responsible	 for	 their	 mortgage	origination	 actions.	 The	 $150	 billion	 collected	 in	 fines	 should	 have	 been	transferred	to	such	fund.		The	 second	 initiative	 is	 to	 avoid,	 in	 principle,	 legal	 action	 against	 mortgage	borrowers.	A	government	organization	would	be	needed,	to	review	and	revise,	if	necessary,	the	terms	and	conditions	of	the	outstanding	mortgage	loan.	This	has	to	be	done	quickly	so	that	borrowers	know	their	own	cash-flow	implications	and	the	 originating	 financial	 institution	 knows	 the	 size	 of	 the	 additional	 loan	 loss	reserves	that	need	to	be	transferred	to	the	Federal	Reserve.		These	two	initiatives,	if	they	had	been	in	place,	would	have	prevented	the	cash-flow	 crisis	 for	 individual	 households	 as	 well	 as	 shielding	 them	 from	 a	 loss	 of	equity	on	their	homes.	Such	initiatives	would	also	have	dramatically	reduced	the	fiscal	 deficit	 of	 2008-2010.	 Consumer	 demand	 would	 probably	 be	 reduced	somewhat,	 but	 certainly	 nowhere	 near	 the	 level	 experienced	 over	 these	 years.	Unemployment	 levels	might	have	increased	somewhat,	but	far	below	the	seven	million	jobs	lost.			The	 need	 for	 quantitative	 easing	 would	 have	 been	 much	 reduced.	 The	 crisis	occurred	 on	mortgages	 already	 in	 place	 and	 a	 lowering	 of	 interest	 rates	 helps	future	mortgage	clients,	but	not	existing	ones	on	30	year	fixed	rate	loans.	As	the	data	 shows	 the	 total	 outstanding	mortgage	 portfolio	 did	 not	 increase	 over	 the	ten	 years	 from	2008.	 Liquidity	 support	was	 needed	 for	 individual	 households,	but	QE	does	not	directly	provide	such	relief	to	this	group	of	households.		
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Concluding	remarks	
	Individual	households	are	not	the	only	ones	affected	by	conversion	of	long	term	liabilities	into	daily	tradable	ones.	Government	debt	levels	in	some	countries	are	probably	 going	 to	 create	 another	 worldwide	 crisis	 of	 confidence.	 In	 a	 recent	speech	in	New	York,	the	governor	of	the	Bank	of	England	warned	of	an	emerging	market	‘fire	sale’	after	a	decade	of	growth	of	asset	management	holdings	in	these	countries	 from	 $50	 trillion	 to	 $80	 trillion,	 of	 which	 some	 $30	 trillion	 were	invested	in	illiquid	assets.19		It	 is	useful	and	necessary	to	study	trends	 in	conversion	in	order	to	predict	and	ultimately	prevent	financial	crises.	After	all	money	should	empower	an	economy	and	not	handicap	it.			Drs	Kees	De	Koning	Chorleywood	U.K.		18th	September	2018	
	
	
																																																																														19	https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2018/10/19/bank-england-governor-warns-emerging-market-fire-sale-triggered/	
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